Browser fingerprinting tor mega

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NSA has not stopped piggybacking on synchronized cookies mostly from Google or Facebook to track individuals using tor. You may have read some months ago fake news widely reported by the mainstream media, claiming that NSA was abandoning its web and phone metadata dragnets. Synchronized cookies are considered metadata at NSA. But mainstream media mostly ignored that inconvenient truth. Too easy? Every major browser searches from the address bar. Pick your poison: DNS logs or search engine logs.

One of the reasons why Google is so popular is because many browsers come installed configured to send all of your search queries to Google. It is always wonderful to see researchers who take the time to inform users about the state of the art. Especially when the news is not bad! Years ago I recall A. Narayan claimed at his website to be in the process of fingerprinting every author who ever posted anything to the web using stylometry.

I wonder whether you know what the current status of that is? I hope that as with browser fingerprinting these claims have proven to be overstated. Arvind Narayanan co-authored a research paper in How much anonymity can be expecetd with Tor Browser on the low security setting? Is it even worth using at this point, or can every PC be easily distinguished anyways? But seriously, the extent to which everyone is lulled into giving up privacy for convenience or bureaucratic expectation is horrifying.

Now we need to pressure developers to adopt it before those developers release new RFCs or proofs of concepts. Great news. It seems that the TB team has abandoned some apparently useful things with no explanation, which I find frustrating as a user. One of these is relevant to the subject of this post:.

Some time ago the TB team said TB would try to find a reasonable default size to avoid making users easily trackable because their screen size was essentially unique among Tor users owing to vagaries of the device on which they run TB.

But recently I noticed that the standard sizes seem to have been abandoned, and when I checked the amiunique website this appears to confirm that very weird nonstandard window sizes are being used to fingerprint TB users. We still round the window on start-up to a multiple of px x px.

Nothing has changes here. What do you get with a clean, new Tor Browser on which operating system? Thanks for the reply. I am using Tails 3. How can I tell? The test site from Laperdrix showed a crazy value which would certainly be very unique. I also use Tor Browser 8. On the least diry one it does seem that TB is choosing some kind of standard size which fits in a x display.

The existing warning appears when the horse has already bolted from the stable, which is no help at all, agreed? That said, letterboxing is supposed to fix that we accidentally disabled it in 9. There is probably not much the TB team can do about onboard mikes included in almost any laptop, PC, or smart phone So why are the mikes enabled by default?

Go to the Tails website. That is, many features are unavailable in Tor Browsers—based on our test, only the following features, notably our newly proposed, still exist, which include the screen width and height ratio, and audio context information e. We believe that it is easy for Tor Browser to normalize these remaining outputs. If the user does allow canvas, she can still be fingerprinted.

The Tor Browser document also mentions a unimplemented software rendering solution, however as noted in Section VI-D, the outputs of software rendering also differ significantly in the same browser. We still believe that this is the way to pursue, but more careful analysis is needed to include all the libraries of software rendering. And I am confused he says "ratio" since the pair of values is obviously more dangerous in terms of fingerprinting. My concern is that my own TB window is being "clipped" by the desktop environment in Tails or Debian 10 as the case may be because for some reason the window is too big for the monitor, although AFAIK my monitors are vanilla.

It seems that GTK has somehow been hopelessly munged in Debian 10, which makes for example Synaptic the package manager very hard to use. If others confirm the issue this could cause unwanted headaches for Tails team as they prepare Tails 4. The default desktop environment in Debian is Gnome, which was once a great choice but almost no-one seems to like Gnome 3.

A recent article suggests that Debian users should choose instead XFCE which indeed seems to be the workable solution for PCs, if you wish to avoid pulling in privacy-hostile "features" like user-behavior-trackers and geoclue which means Gnome and KDE are non-starters. One worry going forward is that when Tails Project issues Tails 4. Although the potential privacy problems of the Battery Status API were discussed by Mozilla and Tor Browser developers as early as in , neither the API, nor the Firefox implementation, has undergone a major revision.

We hope to draw attention to this privacy issue by demonstrating the ways to abuse the API for fingerprinting and tracking. It seems that most of the popular Linux distros use Battery Status API which insanely reports the battery status to double precision, which almost seems to beg for dual-purposing this "innocuous" API for tracking.

Has anyone tried to ask the developers of that API what they were thinking? But not the Tor Browser, as it attempts to maintain a uniform fingerprint across all devices. Yes, and at one time TB team appeared to try to do something like that, but more recent versions of TB seem to be happy to let FF code give the browser a unique height and width.

That is bad. Would it be possible to have TB report to users the current height and width so that they can to manually adjust the size to one of a small set of suggested values given for example in at www. Having TB do this automatically would be much better, though, agreed? I am not sure what you mean with "unique height and width". I think letterboxing will address this problem more thoroughly, though.

Watch out for the next alpha to test it. As far as I understand both techniques this is not possible, but just want to make sure. Also, is there any plan to apply some letterboxing techniques to zoom? Letterboxing is around the content window. Do you mean in the future Tor Browser releases or already in the current 8. So what those gray spaces bring to the table for Tor Browser is preventing any deanonymization via for example accidental maximization. But they do not increase how much of a page the user can see, i.

Is this correct? By the way, what happens in fullscreen mode? So, for the zoom I meant in the upcoming major release, Tor Browser 9, with letterboxing enabled. However, I looked closer now and stand corrected in that letterboxing does not solve the zoom issue automatically. Yes, tricking the page into thinking an area is smaller than it is is very likely futile. So the trade-off here is making the grey areas as small as possible while still providing some kind of defense against screen size fingerprinting.

In fullscreen mode the same technique is applied, that is you might see gray bars around the content area. A good example of that is fingerprinting techniques exploiting Flash. After a badly needed hue and cry from privacy advocates, including this blog site, Flash has apparently become much less used in the real world, so the bad guys the trackers are moving on to other classes of vulnerabilities they can exploit. When first launched, the Tor Browser window has a size of 1,x1, If the user has an unusual screen resolution, this information could be used to identify her as she will be the only Tor user with this screen resolution.

I am not seeing TB open with a size of x, I see it open with a size unique to the device on which I am using TB. This is a problem especially with Tails. Perhaps Tails greeter screen, or even better, Tor Browser itself, could offer a small set of sizes appropriate to a laptop, netbook, tablet, smart phone? What about sites using the mic to listen for sounds such as a passing fire engine? This kind of event sometimes arranged by the bad guys has been used to confirm the suspicion that a connected laptop is in a particular building.

But for some reason Tails does not disable the mic by default. Often people wish to post anonymously, for example in this very blog comment. But as Rachel or Arvind can tell you, stylometry is yet another technique which can be used to deanonymize people. IMO, too little attention has been to this. Have you thought about neuroelectrical scanners? Maryland and such places, then in mass transit chokepoints.

It is said that the goal is both to identify persons and to tell whether or not they are being truthful in their responses to TSA. The techno-stasicrats envision using Big Data methods analyzed with machine learning to combine and process dragnet methods such as these:. Hugely redundant? Yes, that is the point. All signs indicate that such multi-tech dragnet surveillance may become ubiquitous in all countries in only a few years. Hence the need to broaden the scope of privacy-related research.

A second major trend is that in many countries, governments prefer to encourage huge corporations to construct and maintain various dragnet systems; rather than trying to do it all themselves they need only demand covert access to the vast troves of information collected by commercial trackers.

Why pay for a dragnet when you can persuade companies to pay for them, and then quietly pipe the data to the spooks? This was always the danger posed by a company such as Google, and you will have observed that Google has rather openly abandoned its former promise not to share their trove of dangerous data with governments.

In years past, Google and friends claimed that "Google is not going to break down your door". No, but the distinction matters little if Google hands over data which some fascist government or private security force uses to hunt down some minority group for the purpose of "ethnic cleansing". Such concerns appear less and less outlandish with each passing day, even in a country such as the US, whose pundits insisted for so long "that could never happen here" [sic] ignoring the fact that it has, not once but several times in US history.

I was able to do it in Orfox. Okay, so i use an android device. Though i am os android 7, amiunique. Can you give me any info on this issue? How does all that work? How am I expected to have exactly the same fingerprint with the only difference, probably, is browser window site?

I always thought IE was the least secure of all browsers Can you explain this? Claiming to be protecting privacy while building a surveillance machine. It seems like they found some method to find host architecture etc by executing some code and measuring the time it takes.

There is no way to be silent. When a page is displayed, elements on it are positioned according to the size of the browser window. One alternative to silence is to provide information that is commonplace. Guest post by Pierre Laperdrix In the past few years, a technique called browser fingerprinting has received a lot of attention because of the risks it can pose to privacy.

What is browser fingerprinting? Figure 1: Example of a browser fingerprint from a Linux laptop running Firefox 67 In Figure 1, you can see a browser fingerprint taken from my Linux laptop. What makes fingerprinting a threat to online privacy? Other visible changes include the platform, the timezone, and the screen resolution. Figure 3: Warning from the Tor Browser when maximizing the browser window Under the hood, a lot more modifications have been performed to reduce differences between users.

Where we are Over the past few years, research on browser fingerprinting has substantially increased and covers many aspects of the domain. Academic research 1. Industry 1. Conclusion: What lies ahead Browser fingerprinting has grown a lot over the past few years. Comments Please note that the comment area below has been archived. Some solutions, because of….

However, the…. Someone using Tor Browser is…. The security slider is for…. I urge Tor Project to…. Which begs the question: why…. Then why not use the same UA…. Loyal to a fault, I grab the…. Why is do not track not set…. Since I am one of those who…. When I used Tor in , Tor….

When I used Tor in , Tor connects 3 hops that are in the same country. Can you fix it? Tor Project cannot fix…. Node location is less…. Great article. Hopefully that will help the letterboxing naysayers understand a bit better. What means "letterboxing"? Letterboxing is black bars…. Did not know that; thank! Me too using Tails. I was surprised that in TB8…. We partition DOM storage so…. I am not concerned about …. Is there some reason that…. Thank you.

All Tor Browser users are…. It might be useful to list…. I would welcome any additions or corrections to this list. Some other legit goals which might sometimes be hard to reconcile with at least some of the above: o making it easy for Tor Project or even users? Regarding canvas…. Beginning in Firefox 58, the….

Sorry for the confusion. I was writing quickly. Let me try again. Not the OP, but struggling…. Not the OP, but struggling to understand what TB does with canvas : I take the point about not wanting to introduce more third party and possibly buggy code than needed, but do I understand what Mike Perry as quoted elsewhere on this page said to mean that when current TB sees a website asking for canvas data, it returns a blank white canvas image and puts up a weird little icon which is intended to warn the user that the site attempted canvas fingerprinting, and if the user clicks on the weird little icon which is intended to suggest a "canvas", the dialog they see means that TB is assuming they want to prevent that site from canvas fingerprinting the user, but they have the option to allow this if for some reason they want to allow it.

My horrible of expressing myself reflects my confusion That notification box will…. That notification box will be gone with Tor Browser 9. Are you saying NoScript and…. Bonjour je suis nouveau je…. Tor Browser makes it easy …. I guess I need to get out…. It is always wonderful to…. Arvind Narayanan co-authored….

I think these are not related to Narayanan, but they look fairly recent: "The field is dominated by A. Yes, that is who I meant. Sorry for the goof. The name is Narayanan, A…. The name is Narayanan, A. How much anonymity can be…. TB team: It seems that the…. TB team: It seems that the TB team has abandoned some apparently useful things with no explanation, which I find frustrating as a user.

One of these is relevant to the subject of this post: Some time ago the TB team said TB would try to find a reasonable default size to avoid making users easily trackable because their screen size was essentially unique among Tor users owing to vagaries of the device on which they run TB.

We still round the window on…. I am…. From one of the papers cited…. Does the TB team plan to make the suggested improvements to TB? I think we did at least the…. I think we did at least the audio related ones, no? I was reading…. I was reading this From a paper cited in the…. Does the TB team plan to explore making the suggested improvements to TB? From a paper cited in…. So this has been known for long time. The API got ripped out…. The API got ripped out browser wide, so we are good. Does TB team plan to address this problem?

I am not sure what you mean…. Letterboxing is around the…. What do you mean with the "allow more content visible" question? So, you can zoom as much as…. So, for the zoom I meant in…. Laperdrix: A few…. Stating both N and the divergence is probably best. Thanks for writing the paper!

I like the applications. Okay, so i use an android…. I have visited that site and…. Another excellent resource…. How do you tell your browser…. How do you tell your browser not to tell info about your system such as your screen size? Таковая разработка именуется Cross-Browser Fingerprinting и она дозволяет отслеживать: Операционную систему Количество ядер в процессоре Перечень шрифтов и установленные языки Анализ ответов на выполняемые браузером операции, в которых задействованы операционная система и составляющие аппаратного обеспечения компа.

Такие данные не зависят от браузера. Сейчас обсудим, как это обходить. VPN и прокси-серверы Тут кратко. Прокси - бесплатная прокладка, которая не шифрует ваш трафик. Не скупитесь на неплохой многоканальный ВПН - и включайте его даже переходя на выделенный сервер о котором мы побеседуем далее Браузеры.

Самым надежным считается Firefox. На него устанавливаем плагины: User Agent Swither - плагин осуществляет замену идентификации браузера. Ghoster - плагин блокирующий трекеры аналитики, рекламы и другие маячки. Также есть специально собранные браузеры для анонимного интернет серфинга TOR - самый узнаваемый и популярный посреди таковых браузер, врата в даркнет. Pale Moon - браузер с открытым кодом на базе Firefox Вручную Сделать собственный цифровой след наименее неповторимым посодействуют ручные конфигурации.

Изменение часового пояса устройства; Установка другого языка операционной системы устройства; Установка другого языка браузера; Изменение разрешения экрана устройства; Изменение масштаба веб-страницы; Установка или удаление плагинов браузера Отключение выполнения Flash, Javascript и WebGL Конструктивные способы, но очень неловкие для серфинга. Выделенные серверы Внедрение дедиков от слова dedicated server до сих пор считается одним из самым действенных методов сохранить свою анонимность.

Тест Опосля всех манипуляций нужно проверить все актуальные футпринты, которые посылает ваш браузер. При использовании Multiloginapp инспектируйте каждый профиль Whoer. Все объявления. Избранные Записи. Партнёркин в Телеграме. Лишь нужный контент и бесплатные «ништяки». Сергей Ответить. И где же можно приобрести эти самые дедики для регистрации акков адвордс?

Edu-Money Ответить. Их бесчисленное множество, мы для собственных нужд используем Vultr Предварительно проверить трудно, опосля покупки уже необходимо проверить в онлайн сервисах. Ежели вдруг айпи под фильтрами, саппорты меняют по просьбе. Александр Ответить. Сможете объяснить, верно ли я вас сообразил. То есть, ежели я беру для себя дедик, я получаю возможность употреблять удаленный комп через некоторое ПО, и с этого компа просматривать к примеру вэб странички таковым образом, чтоб хозяева этих вэб страничек никак не могли вычислить, что конкретно я со собственного компа хи просматриваю?

К примеру, ежели я зарегистрировался кое-где, и мне нужно сделать 2-ой акк, и я точно знаю, что они употребляют фингерпринтинг, то, ежели я зарегистрируюсь, используя выделенный сервер, у их не будет никакой способности опознать, что это опять я? Макс Ответить. Не сообразил Ответить. И что в итоге? Чем воспользоваться то? Накидали в кучу выжимок из всяких статей в инете, а по существу ничего не произнесли. Алексей Ответить. Похожие статьи.

Блогов Всего постов За день 5. Комментов Оценок Партнеркин - наикрупнейшее независящее медиа в области арбитража трафика, партнерских программ и заработка в вебе. Из наших материалов вы сможете выяснить как зарабатывать на веб-сайте и как добывать трафик. В отдельном разделе мы собрали для вас прибыльные CPA кейсы А ежели возникнут сомнения, смело входите в Вопросцы и ответы.

Каждым как в тор браузере поменять язык megaruzxpnew4af ошибаетесь

Доставка заказе с 8. Наш интернет-магазин оплата: составляющие для от суммы заказа и Вашего работы: мы можем предложить масла, жидкие масла, вариантов доставки:1 мыла, отдушки, красители, щелочь, эфирные свечной благовония, салфетки для флаконы. Новейший пятницу телефон.

Many defenses are working in concert. However, nodes could run compromised software that negates some defenses. But if you limit yourself from large groups of nodes as you build circuits, you affect other statistics of identifying your traffic. Tor benefits from more diversity in general. Letterboxing is black bars around video or images to fit in a different sized display.

You will see it in Tor Browser soon because it helps to impede browser fingerprinting that detects your window resolution numbers. Results are worse if you enable JS slider at "safer" but bad even if you put slider to "safest". How to interpret this? I think questions about the authors tool should be addressed in comments or in a followup.

I was surprised that in TB8 dom. Firefox is a leaky boat and it seems some at Mozilla are working with a drill on new versions. Outright disabling a feature is just the last resort but luckily we can do better in that case. Am I correct in guessing that your thinking here is that disabling a feature like DOM storage entirely would likely be noticeable by websites which could exploit this to more easily distinguish Tor Browser users from "ordinary FF"?

But surely they can easily see from the IP that the visitor is coming from a Tor exit node? Cannot Tor Project bring back Pierre Laperdrix for a followup explaining why he guesses Tor users are reporting the "almost unique" results from his fingerprinting test tool? I hope that part of the answer would be that the results reported by this tool are based almost entirely upon non-Tor users, but no-one has actually stated that, and I have found through long experience that bad things happen when no-one bothers to ask or answer questions about thoughtless assumptions which might prove to be very incorrect.

I think I support the general goal of making Tor users hard to distinguish from others but only until almost everyone uses Tor for almost everything of course while also making it hard to distinguish individual Tor users from other Tor users, and I can see that this hard. So we are asking questions not to criticize, only just to know. I am not concerned about "more easily" detecting Tor Browser users apart from Firefox users. There is probably no way to hide the former in the latter.

The goal is to have a large as possible crowd of Tor Browser users being on the same Tor Browser version. Disabling things like DOM storage harms that goal in that this breaks functionality that leads users away from Tor Browser.

Yes, Tor Browser users stand out compared to other browser users. Is there some reason that the Canvas Blocker extension is not installed by default? It functions perfectly by default providing random hash codes for both DOMRect and canvas, leaving the user with total fingerprinting protection. We provide a proper defense by default in Tor Browser instead. My fingerprint signature, after refreshing the page, remains static.

This mean I have been positively identified by the hash code. Can you please elaborate how I am protected against fingerprinting when I have just proven otherwise? All Tor Browser users are sending the same value back by default.

It might be useful to list some of the things we might have in mind when we say that we Tor users want to appear "just like the others". Off the top of my head:. Some other legit goals which might sometimes be hard to reconcile with at least some of the above:.

Regarding canvas fingerprinting, some months ago I began to notice a weird icon appearing at many sites. Eventually someone told me this is the canvas icon and that it appears when a website is asking permission to fingerprint your browser. Reading between the lines of what you wrote, I guess FF does not ask permission, it just silently gives up the fingerprinting data, whereas TB asks the user for permission. But why on earth would a TB user say "yes"?

Except by mistake? And what happens if the user fails to answer the question? After a timeout does TB assume that the user has given permission? I hope not, but I worry. In any case, until your statement I had no reason to think TB was actually blocking the fingerprinting, although I hoped this was the case.

Which I admit TP mostly does not. Still, fingerprinting seems like such a basic topic and is essential to protect against to have any chance of meeting the anonymity goals which are driving more and more ordinary people to try Tor Browser. One of the targeted sites is said to be youtube. Apple admitted that this appears to be true, but rather horrifyingly appeared to suggest that because the presumed targets were Uyghurs, "ordinary people" need not worry. I suspect this assumption on the part of Apple is flat out wrong, and in any case I hate the suggestion that Uyghurs are not people too.

Any comment? Do you know whether Debian is addressing problems which could cause trouble for Tails as they work to release Tails 4. What about the battery API issue? The HTML5 canvas feature allows a webpage to draw or animate images. Some pages draw features on the canvas that a user may want, but extraction of those images is different. If the user fails to answer, Mike Perry said in that Firefox bug report, "In Tor Browser, we have opted to have the canvas return white image data until the user has accepted a doorhanger UI that flips a site permission to either enable or permanently block canvas access from that site.

Why are you asking Tor Project about iOS and youtube? Rather than asking Tor Project, ask individuals. Which debunks a false argument against using encryption, Tor, etc. Which debunks a false argument against using the best available defenses, such as Tails. The revelation which shocked the security world is that everyone who visited youtube. Any further light which can be shed upon the affair is potentially valuable information to Tor users seeking to assess the dangers we face. I take the point about not wanting to introduce more third party and possibly buggy code than needed, but do I understand what Mike Perry as quoted elsewhere on this page said to mean that when current TB sees a website asking for canvas data, it returns a blank white canvas image and puts up a weird little icon which is intended to warn the user that the site attempted canvas fingerprinting, and if the user clicks on the weird little icon which is intended to suggest a "canvas", the dialog they see means that TB is assuming they want to prevent that site from canvas fingerprinting the user, but they have the option to allow this if for some reason they want to allow it.

While I have your attention, another issue which came up is that it is all too easy to accidently hit that tiny box which instantly maximizes the Tor Browser window game over. Would it be hard to simply disable that maximization box? I can see why a FF user might want to be able to maximize their browser with a click on a box, but surely not TB user would be want to do that on purpose? Scroll through the source looking for suspicious URIs and hope to find none?

Or something more? Tor Browser makes it easy maybe too easy to get in the habit of searching Duckduckgo engine rather than Google search engine. If you download and install Tor Browser, in the location pane where the url appears , try typing something which does not begin with http: or https: The browser interprets that as a search query and redirects it to Duckduckgo by default or to another search engine of your choosing, via tor circuits.

NSA has not stopped piggybacking on synchronized cookies mostly from Google or Facebook to track individuals using tor. You may have read some months ago fake news widely reported by the mainstream media, claiming that NSA was abandoning its web and phone metadata dragnets. Synchronized cookies are considered metadata at NSA. But mainstream media mostly ignored that inconvenient truth. Too easy? Every major browser searches from the address bar. Pick your poison: DNS logs or search engine logs.

One of the reasons why Google is so popular is because many browsers come installed configured to send all of your search queries to Google. It is always wonderful to see researchers who take the time to inform users about the state of the art. Especially when the news is not bad! Years ago I recall A.

Narayan claimed at his website to be in the process of fingerprinting every author who ever posted anything to the web using stylometry. I wonder whether you know what the current status of that is? I hope that as with browser fingerprinting these claims have proven to be overstated.

Arvind Narayanan co-authored a research paper in How much anonymity can be expecetd with Tor Browser on the low security setting? Is it even worth using at this point, or can every PC be easily distinguished anyways?

But seriously, the extent to which everyone is lulled into giving up privacy for convenience or bureaucratic expectation is horrifying. Now we need to pressure developers to adopt it before those developers release new RFCs or proofs of concepts. Great news. It seems that the TB team has abandoned some apparently useful things with no explanation, which I find frustrating as a user.

One of these is relevant to the subject of this post:. Some time ago the TB team said TB would try to find a reasonable default size to avoid making users easily trackable because their screen size was essentially unique among Tor users owing to vagaries of the device on which they run TB. But recently I noticed that the standard sizes seem to have been abandoned, and when I checked the amiunique website this appears to confirm that very weird nonstandard window sizes are being used to fingerprint TB users.

We still round the window on start-up to a multiple of px x px. Nothing has changes here. What do you get with a clean, new Tor Browser on which operating system? Thanks for the reply. I am using Tails 3. How can I tell? The test site from Laperdrix showed a crazy value which would certainly be very unique. I also use Tor Browser 8. On the least diry one it does seem that TB is choosing some kind of standard size which fits in a x display.

The existing warning appears when the horse has already bolted from the stable, which is no help at all, agreed? That said, letterboxing is supposed to fix that we accidentally disabled it in 9. There is probably not much the TB team can do about onboard mikes included in almost any laptop, PC, or smart phone So why are the mikes enabled by default?

Go to the Tails website. That is, many features are unavailable in Tor Browsers—based on our test, only the following features, notably our newly proposed, still exist, which include the screen width and height ratio, and audio context information e. We believe that it is easy for Tor Browser to normalize these remaining outputs. If the user does allow canvas, she can still be fingerprinted. The Tor Browser document also mentions a unimplemented software rendering solution, however as noted in Section VI-D, the outputs of software rendering also differ significantly in the same browser.

We still believe that this is the way to pursue, but more careful analysis is needed to include all the libraries of software rendering. And I am confused he says "ratio" since the pair of values is obviously more dangerous in terms of fingerprinting. My concern is that my own TB window is being "clipped" by the desktop environment in Tails or Debian 10 as the case may be because for some reason the window is too big for the monitor, although AFAIK my monitors are vanilla.

It seems that GTK has somehow been hopelessly munged in Debian 10, which makes for example Synaptic the package manager very hard to use. If others confirm the issue this could cause unwanted headaches for Tails team as they prepare Tails 4. The default desktop environment in Debian is Gnome, which was once a great choice but almost no-one seems to like Gnome 3. A recent article suggests that Debian users should choose instead XFCE which indeed seems to be the workable solution for PCs, if you wish to avoid pulling in privacy-hostile "features" like user-behavior-trackers and geoclue which means Gnome and KDE are non-starters.

One worry going forward is that when Tails Project issues Tails 4. Although the potential privacy problems of the Battery Status API were discussed by Mozilla and Tor Browser developers as early as in , neither the API, nor the Firefox implementation, has undergone a major revision. We hope to draw attention to this privacy issue by demonstrating the ways to abuse the API for fingerprinting and tracking. It seems that most of the popular Linux distros use Battery Status API which insanely reports the battery status to double precision, which almost seems to beg for dual-purposing this "innocuous" API for tracking.

Has anyone tried to ask the developers of that API what they were thinking? But not the Tor Browser, as it attempts to maintain a uniform fingerprint across all devices. Yes, and at one time TB team appeared to try to do something like that, but more recent versions of TB seem to be happy to let FF code give the browser a unique height and width. That is bad. Would it be possible to have TB report to users the current height and width so that they can to manually adjust the size to one of a small set of suggested values given for example in at www.

Having TB do this automatically would be much better, though, agreed? I am not sure what you mean with "unique height and width". I think letterboxing will address this problem more thoroughly, though. Watch out for the next alpha to test it. As far as I understand both techniques this is not possible, but just want to make sure.

Also, is there any plan to apply some letterboxing techniques to zoom? Letterboxing is around the content window. Do you mean in the future Tor Browser releases or already in the current 8. So what those gray spaces bring to the table for Tor Browser is preventing any deanonymization via for example accidental maximization. But they do not increase how much of a page the user can see, i. Is this correct? By the way, what happens in fullscreen mode?

So, for the zoom I meant in the upcoming major release, Tor Browser 9, with letterboxing enabled. However, I looked closer now and stand corrected in that letterboxing does not solve the zoom issue automatically. Yes, tricking the page into thinking an area is smaller than it is is very likely futile. So the trade-off here is making the grey areas as small as possible while still providing some kind of defense against screen size fingerprinting.

In fullscreen mode the same technique is applied, that is you might see gray bars around the content area. A good example of that is fingerprinting techniques exploiting Flash. After a badly needed hue and cry from privacy advocates, including this blog site, Flash has apparently become much less used in the real world, so the bad guys the trackers are moving on to other classes of vulnerabilities they can exploit.

When first launched, the Tor Browser window has a size of 1,x1, If the user has an unusual screen resolution, this information could be used to identify her as she will be the only Tor user with this screen resolution. I am not seeing TB open with a size of x, I see it open with a size unique to the device on which I am using TB. This is a problem especially with Tails. Perhaps Tails greeter screen, or even better, Tor Browser itself, could offer a small set of sizes appropriate to a laptop, netbook, tablet, smart phone?

What about sites using the mic to listen for sounds such as a passing fire engine? This kind of event sometimes arranged by the bad guys has been used to confirm the suspicion that a connected laptop is in a particular building. But for some reason Tails does not disable the mic by default. Often people wish to post anonymously, for example in this very blog comment. But as Rachel or Arvind can tell you, stylometry is yet another technique which can be used to deanonymize people.

IMO, too little attention has been to this. Have you thought about neuroelectrical scanners? Maryland and such places, then in mass transit chokepoints. It is said that the goal is both to identify persons and to tell whether or not they are being truthful in their responses to TSA. The techno-stasicrats envision using Big Data methods analyzed with machine learning to combine and process dragnet methods such as these:. Hugely redundant? Yes, that is the point. All signs indicate that such multi-tech dragnet surveillance may become ubiquitous in all countries in only a few years.

Hence the need to broaden the scope of privacy-related research. A second major trend is that in many countries, governments prefer to encourage huge corporations to construct and maintain various dragnet systems; rather than trying to do it all themselves they need only demand covert access to the vast troves of information collected by commercial trackers.

Why pay for a dragnet when you can persuade companies to pay for them, and then quietly pipe the data to the spooks? This was always the danger posed by a company such as Google, and you will have observed that Google has rather openly abandoned its former promise not to share their trove of dangerous data with governments. In years past, Google and friends claimed that "Google is not going to break down your door".

No, but the distinction matters little if Google hands over data which some fascist government or private security force uses to hunt down some minority group for the purpose of "ethnic cleansing". Such concerns appear less and less outlandish with each passing day, even in a country such as the US, whose pundits insisted for so long "that could never happen here" [sic] ignoring the fact that it has, not once but several times in US history.

I was able to do it in Orfox. Okay, so i use an android device. Though i am os android 7, amiunique. Can you give me any info on this issue? How does all that work? How am I expected to have exactly the same fingerprint with the only difference, probably, is browser window site? I always thought IE was the least secure of all browsers Can you explain this? Claiming to be protecting privacy while building a surveillance machine. It seems like they found some method to find host architecture etc by executing some code and measuring the time it takes.

There is no way to be silent. When a page is displayed, elements on it are positioned according to the size of the browser window. One alternative to silence is to provide information that is commonplace. Guest post by Pierre Laperdrix In the past few years, a technique called browser fingerprinting has received a lot of attention because of the risks it can pose to privacy. What is browser fingerprinting? Figure 1: Example of a browser fingerprint from a Linux laptop running Firefox 67 In Figure 1, you can see a browser fingerprint taken from my Linux laptop.

What makes fingerprinting a threat to online privacy? Other visible changes include the platform, the timezone, and the screen resolution. Figure 3: Warning from the Tor Browser when maximizing the browser window Under the hood, a lot more modifications have been performed to reduce differences between users.

Where we are Over the past few years, research on browser fingerprinting has substantially increased and covers many aspects of the domain. Academic research 1. Industry 1. Conclusion: What lies ahead Browser fingerprinting has grown a lot over the past few years. Comments Please note that the comment area below has been archived.

Some solutions, because of…. However, the…. Someone using Tor Browser is…. The security slider is for…. I urge Tor Project to…. Which begs the question: why…. Then why not use the same UA…. Loyal to a fault, I grab the…. Why is do not track not set…. Since I am one of those who…. When I used Tor in , Tor…. When I used Tor in , Tor connects 3 hops that are in the same country. Can you fix it? Tor Project cannot fix….

Node location is less…. Great article. Hopefully that will help the letterboxing naysayers understand a bit better. В версиях до 5. Способ Font. Но так как по умолчанию в Tor отключены плагины Flash, можно употреблять последующие меры для определения перечня шрифтов:. Эти способы будут работать в Tor 5. Сработает с Intel Pentium 4 и наиболее новенькими процессорами. Выполнение томных вычислений с внедрением пары потоков в Web Workers API дозволяет подсчитать количество ядер процессора, а также найти наличие либо отсутствие технологии Hyper-threading.

Частоту обновления и время отклика монитора можно найти с помощью способа requestAnimationFrame, при этом это пройдет с Tor 5. Таковым образом, они просто могут употребляться для идентификации браузера. Невзирая на все усилия Tor-сообщества сохранить анонимность юзеров, как мы можем созидать, все еще существует несколько проверенных способов, позволяющих точно найти, что юзер вышел в Сеть через Tor.

Ознакомившись с сиим материалом, вы, может быть, будете иметь на руках наиболее полную картину, а означает, можете сделать определенные меры, которые дозволят для вас сохранить конфиденциальность. Внедрение материалов веб-сайта с полной копией оригинала допускается лишь с письменного разрешения администрации.

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Испытать ». Ввысь Проголосовало: Введение Идентификация браузера Tor HTTP-заголовок Перечень шрифтов SSE2-тест Частота обновления Refresh Rate Выводы Введение Беря во внимание то, что способности обеспечения анонимности, предоставляемые Tor, употребляются в киберкриминальной среде, отслеживание и идентификация браузеров повсевременно совершенствуются.

Идентификация браузера Tor Браузер Tor защищен от большинства обыденных способов идентификации браузера. Перечень шрифтов Способ Font. Но так как по умолчанию в Tor отключены плагины Flash, можно употреблять последующие меры для определения перечня шрифтов: JavaScript с CSS можно употреблять методом вычисления ширины и высоты шрифтов по умолчанию и следующего их сопоставления с установленными у пользователя.